India’s new coal geography: Coastal transformations, imported fuel and state-business collaboration in the transition to more fossil fuel energy by Oskarsson, Patrik et al.
Energy Research & Social Science 73 (2021) 101903
Available online 14 January 2021
2214-6296/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
India’s new coal geography: Coastal transformations, imported fuel and 
state-business collaboration in the transition to more fossil fuel energy 
Patrik Oskarsson a,*, Kenneth Bo Nielsen b, Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt c, Brototi Roy d 
a Department of Rural and Urban Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden 
b Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, Norway 
c Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Australia 
d Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain   




Coal energy infrastructure 
Energy security 
India 
A B S T R A C T   
The advance of renewable energy around the world has kindled hopes that coal-based energy is on the way out. 
Recent data, however, make it clear that growing coal consumption in India coupled with its continued use in 
China keeps coal-based energy at 40 percent of the world’s heat and power generation. To address the consol-
idation of coal-based power in India, this article analyses an energy transition to, rather than away from, carbon- 
intensive energy over the past two decades. We term this transition India’s new coal geography; the new coal 
geography comprises new ports and thermal power plants run by private-sector actors along the coastline and 
fuelled by imported coal. This geography runs parallel to, yet is distinct from, India’s ‘old’ coal geography, which 
was based on domestic public-sector coal mining and thermal power generation. We understand the development 
of coastal thermal power as an outcome of long-term electrical energy shortages and significant public contro-
versy within the old coal geography. By analysing the making of the new coal geography at a national level, and 
scrutinizing its localised manifestation and impact through a case study of Goa state, we outline the significant 
infrastructural investment and policy work of a dispersed network of public- and private-sector actors that slowly 
enabled this new coal energy avatar. We argue that the enormous effort to establish India’s new coal geography 
further entrenches the country’s reliance on coal. The result is that for India, energy security is a choice between 
domestic and imported coal.   
1. Introduction 
While Europe and North America are transitioning away from coal, 
its reign over power generation is not over yet. Among the main coun-
tries that consume coal, India remains a key player: not only is domestic 
coal extraction and use still expanding – the country is also emerging as 
a key agent in the global coal trade as the second biggest importer [1,2]. 
India’s increasing use of coal, coupled with China’s unrelenting coal 
consumption, means that coal contributes 40 percent of the world’s total 
power and heat generation: a share in global energy production which 
has remained the same for the past 40 years in spite of growing attempts 
at decarbonisation [2]. The catastrophic implications of burning coal for 
power generation at this rate are well documented and can on its own 
destabilise the climate change target of staying below the two-degree 
centigrade rise in temperature [3,4]. 
India is expected to become the main international coal importer in 
the future as Chinese reliance on imported coal reduces [2,3], with 
Indonesia and Australia being the main coal exporting countries [5]. 
India has long imported higher purity coking coal for steel-making, 
primarily from Australia. The import of thermal coal for power pro-
duction is, however, entirely new. Before 2002, thermal coal did not 
even exist as a category in official trade statistics.1 In the fiscal year 
2007–2008, India imported 10 million tons of thermal coal. This rose to 
45 million tons in 2011–2012 [6].2 The latest available figure from 2018 
to 2019 shows imports of 150 million tons [7],3 and for the fiscal year 
2019–2020, the projection is 200 million tons [9]. Using 2007–2008 as a 
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baseline, this amounts to an increase in recorded imports of 1,400 
percent in just over a decade. 
In response to India’s dramatically increasing coal imports, we 
analyse the production of what we term India’s new coal geography: an 
entirely new landscape of thermal power infrastructure based on inter-
national supplies of coal, which has so far not been mapped and ana-
lysed systematically. The new coal geography is predominantly coastal 
and controlled by private actors who operate ports and power plants that 
rely on imported coal. And it runs parallel to the domestic public-sector 
mining and power generation of the ‘old’ coal geography. To map and 
analyse this new coal geography, we ask: What are the political- 
economic and technical-infrastructural realignments that have enabled 
coal-based power generation in this new coal geography? How is this 
geography configured at the national level and how do subnational re-
gions change infrastructurally, politically and environmentally when 
they are integrated into the new coal geography? By addressing these 
questions that incorporate both the making of the new coal geography at 
a national level and its localised manifestations and impact in specific 
contexts, we argue that India’s rise as a global player in coal trade, 
coupled with the emergence of a new coal geography at home, repre-
sents an energy transition to (more) coal-based energy. This energy 
transition will add to India’s already substantial reliance on coal energy 
for years to come, with significant negative consequences for global 
climate change. This finding is in line with recent research on energy 
transitions that show the remarkable endurance of fossil fuels like coal, 
in spite of available, lower cost renewable options both globally [10–12] 
and in India [13,14]. 
The article is structured as follows. We start our analysis of the 
making of India’s new coal geography by providing theoretical entry 
points into energy transitions and the making of resource geographies. 
This is followed by a discussion of our methods. We then proceed to map 
and analyse the new national coal geography, followed by its localised 
manifestations and impact through a case study of the Indian state of 
Goa, which is rapidly emerging as a new coal hub. In the next analytical 
section, we bring our findings from the national and the state level 
together. Finally, in the conclusion, we reflect on how the enormous 
scale of financial and political investments that has enabled India’s new 
coal geography is likely to block the country’s transition away from coal. 
2. An energy transition to (more) coal-based energy 
The sizeable literature on energy transitions has, to date, mainly 
focused on how to design, implement, govern and operate new low- 
carbon power production facilities, based on the assumption that older 
forms of energy will disappear once renewable options become available 
[10,15]. One cause for great optimism has been the increasing avail-
ability of cost-competitive forms of renewable energy around the world 
giving impetus to the massive decarbonisation efforts that are urgently 
needed. One factor that underpins the optimism in much of the energy- 
transitions literature is the understanding of energy transitions as the 
process of a new fuel acquiring a large or dominant share of overall use 
[16]. Following this definition, historical examples of energy transitions 
include transitions from wood to coal and from coal to oil. However, if 
we focus not on the share, but rather on the total amount of energy used, 
a quite different picture emerges wherein no actual energy transition has 
ever taken place in modern times [10] as the amount of coal, wood and 
oil that are currently used globally are all at historic highs. New energy 
forms, including more recent renewable ones, are, from this perspective, 
what Bell and York [11] term additions rather than transitions. This is 
the case because older forms of energy may reduce their overall share of 
energy use but remain important, or even continue to increase, in terms 
of amount. From an energy addition perspective, the global energy 
system remains locked into high coal-energy use for the foreseeable 
future undermining reports of ’a terminal decline’ [12,17]. An energy 
addition perspective in this manner focuses our attention on how ‘the 
teleological model [of energy transition research] asserting the “death of 
coal” needs to be fundamentally re-examined’ ([10]: 208). 
As some parts of the world reduce their use of coal, primarily Europe 
and North America, it becomes pertinent to understand how and why 
India is not only expanding domestic coal production and use but also 
adding an entirely new energy geography based on imported coal 
[2,18]. Understanding the specific national and international networks 
that continue to support high carbon energy is vitally important in order 
to seek actual energy transitions away from the use of fossil fuels rather 
than merely adding renewable energy on top of existing fuels, as has 
been the case at a global level to date. To understand the emergence of 
new coal energy, we draw inspiration from recent work on resource 
geographies within Human Geography, and specifically assemblage 
thinking, which enables us to see the interlinking of different networks 
of humans and materials [19-21]. Putting in place a complex resource 
geography like coal energy is, from this perspective, always ‘a process of 
making, of continuous transformation, and of becoming, rather than as 
something final or static’ ([22]: 240). Resource geographies rely on a set 
of interlinked logics of economy, territory and subject formation [23,24] 
that bring together a rich ‘energyscape’ [5] of new relations, as different 
sites become connected in the production, transportation, generation 
and transmission of energy. Such relations not only shape energy and 
socio-environmental outcomes; they also crucially produce economies 
and forms of politics whose impact may span generations [25]. If we 
understand resources and energy ‘as interconnected networks tying 
together sites and scales’ ([26]: 434], we see how the shaping of a new 
(coal) resource geography depends on much more than merely infra-
structural solutions. By looking across ‘material infrastructures, socio- 
cultural artefacts and political structures’ ([26]: 437), energy appears 
as ‘fragmented, contested and converted at particular sites’ ([26]: 446). 
New resource geographies – in our case, India’s new coal geography – 
thus emerge as one spatial aspect of ‘a global assemblage of finance, 
infrastructure, and expertise that together constitutes the political 
economy of coal’ ([27]: 153–154). Rather than seeing energy produc-
tion as a singular and fully functional system with a controlled and 
centralised design, this conceptualisation draws our attention to 
distributed experimentation by many different actors in pursuit of par-
tial and compartmentalised energy solutions. 
In this article, we analyse one crucial aspect of the present energy-
scape of coal, namely, how the assemblage of the network of relations 
across Indian national and state government together with domestic and 
international private sector entities in power generation, logistics, and 
transmission produce India’s new coal geography. Coal is perhaps the 
resource that more than any other material commodity has shaped India 
as a nation, including its political economy and ecology [28]. Coal 
transforms landscapes and rearranges social relations around the coal-
fields, along transport routes and in India’s megacities where much of 
the electrical energy is consumed. Coal is also fundamental to India’s 
national and global relations by influencing industrial growth, the bal-
ance of trade and national energy-security concerns. Crucially, the 
availability of coal in large quantities close to the surface across central- 
eastern India, the long history of extraction with significant technical 
and infrastructural provisions and the many-faceted and multi-tentacled 
bureaucratic superstructure that surrounds it combine to give unprece-
dented preferential status to this fossil fuel – in spite of the many factors 
that support a transition to low-carbon energy. The creation over the 
past two decades of a new coal geography in India marks a significant 
departure from the well-established trajectory of domestic energy se-
curity rooted in coal-based resource nationalism, what Chatterjee [29] 
calls India’s model of fossil developmentalism. 
A prerequisite for understanding how this new coal geography has 
been assembled is to disentangle the existing system of domestic coal 
economies in India. Lahiri-Dutt [30] uses the concept of ‘coal worlds’ to 
show that that the Indian coal industry is neither singular nor homog-
enous. She identifies four separate coal economies, which she terms 
national, neoliberal, statecraft and subsistence coal. With multiple and 
complex labour arrangements, these coal economies are defined by 
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different coal worlds that have distinct production logics and labour and 
supply arrangements. The first two coal economies (national and 
neoliberal) constitute the official economies that contribute to large- 
scale power production in the public sector, for electrical energy, and 
in the private sector, to generate power for industries like cement and 
steel. The two other worlds constitute the informal sector, with varying 
degrees of legality involved; and they present different community uses 
of coal in small-scale operations that might even defy straightforward 
distinctions between legal and illegal (hence termed non-legal by Lahiri- 
Dutt). Against this backdrop, the new coastal coal geography has 
emerged as a fifth coal world in India since about the year 2005. This 
new coal world operates within the formal large-scale system of coal 
energy, yet with distinct production logics and supply arrangements vis- 
à-vis the other two formal coal worlds, in addition to the specific spatial 
dynamic of coastal infrastructure.4 
The backbone of Indian energy security was always Lahiri-Dutt’s 
[30] national coal: domestically produced coal that relied on a set of 
interlinked public sector enterprises. In this ‘old’ (and still-expanding) 
coal geography, the state-owned enterprise Coal India Limited extracts 
coal in the central and eastern parts of the country. This coal is then 
transported by the Indian Railways via heavy-duty links to the main 
cities of the north, west and south, with the National Thermal Power 
Corporation – or one of the many state electricity boards around the 
country – as final customers. All this is done for electricity generation 
primarily for the “urban-industrial nexus” [28].5 India’s coal energy 
sector has, in stages since India’s Independence, managed to put in place 
a relatively robust model for coal extraction and transport and for 
electricity generation and transmission. The sector has been able to 
produce and transport ever larger amounts of coal, particularly from the 
1980s onward, to new and expanding metropolitan power plants, even 
as it has faced stiff resistance and pressure from a vast number of groups 
and actors around the country [28,31]. Yet in spite of its vast scale and 
substantial policy support, neither coal production nor thermal power 
generation have ever kept pace with electricity demand [31,32]. India’s 
old coal geography has continued to struggle to serve all consumers, to 
remain financially viable and to adhere to environmental and social 
legislation [31]. Reforms to increase coal-based power generation have 
included opening up to private sector coal mining and power generation 
for use in cases such as, for example, steel and cement production in 
1993 [28]. Significant weaknesses have, however, remained, and these 
culminated in the early 2000s, when the already distressed old coal 
geography entered into a prolonged state of crisis as the large gap be-
tween demand and supply escalated dramatically. As other forms of 
electricity production failed to contribute, India’s inability to supply 
electricity in line with developmental targets, and with the aspirations of 
key pressure groups [31,32], became evident. A discourse of ‘a national 
energy crisis’ subsequently took hold and set in motion policies and 
programs seeking to expand energy production outside of the traditional 
central-eastern coal heartland. 
Another aspect of the ‘energy crisis’ is the profile of Indian coal and 
thermal power companies as among the lowest cost producers in the 
world [33]. A large part of this low-cost profile – the ability to produce 
cheap coal-based electricity – is the sector’s inability or unwillingness to 
deal appropriately with a range of social and environmental conse-
quences, including compensation and resettlement of project affected 
populations, environmental mitigation, and proper mining closure and 
post-mining rehabilitation when operations stop [28,34,35]. The reor-
ientation of coal-based energy production to new territories, that is, the 
coastal regions, promises improved stability against some of the chal-
lenges that plagued the old geography, such as ‘disruptive’ public 
protests and litigation related to mines and thermal power plants 
[28,36]. In addition, the coastal states along India’s western and south- 
eastern coastline generally display a more predictable pro-business 
orientation, are better governed, and are less prone to political insta-
bility and unpredictable populist policies that have often characterised 
the central and eastern coal belt. The move away from the forests and 
agricultural fields into new territories has generated new political con-
flicts due to new forms of land expropriation and dispossession [37,38]. 
Operating along the coastline comes with new challenges, including 
administrative approvals to use often ecologically sensitive stretches of 
land [39] as well as environmental and other clearances and permissions 
[28,29]. While coastal land might be seen as ‘available’ – since owner-
ship, as is the case in the coal-bearing inland, is vested with the state as 
common property [38] – or is seen as ‘unproductively used land’ [40], 
much coastal land is in fact occupied by informal land users, generating 
new conflicts and resistance movements.6 Coastal coal infrastructure, 
like elsewhere in the country, thus requires high-level political support 
to secure land and administrative approvals for developers. 
India’s new coal geography signifies dramatic rearrangements of 
coastal land use, the rise of new private players in the sector, significant 
infrastructural transformations, realigned domestic energy-security 
concerns and modified international relations – even as it extends and 
solidifies the use of coal energy at a time when renewable alternatives 
are not only needed but are also increasingly affordable. Understanding 
the making and manifestation of this new coal geography thus offers 
important insights into the future of coal, not just in India, but globally. 
Before we turn to a more detailed mapping and analysis of the making 
and manifestation of India’s new coal geography, we introduce our 
research methods. 
3. Research design and methods 
In this exploratory case study we outline and explain the emergence 
of a new, national coal-based energy geography that is separate from the 
dominant geography of thermal power production in India. Following 
Bridge and Gailing we understand energy transitions as ‘the production 
of novel combinations of energy systems and social relations across 
space’ ([44]: 1038). Further, we define India’s new coal geography as 
coal energy infrastructure established in coastal India with mainly pri-
vate sector involvement, predominantly using imported coal,7 and 
supported by the Government of India (GoI) in the fields of energy 
policy, infrastructure and land governance. Such coastal energy infra-
structure was absent across India before the year 2005, barring in a few 
megacities such as Mumbai or Chennai. 
Our political economy understanding of energy transitions enables 
us to look beyond socio-technical solutions in infrastructure to embrace 
political challenges, which shape outcomes [44,45]. Significant con-
troversy has followed the development of India’s new coal geography 
with differences of opinion within the national government and wide-
spread resistance to specific projects among various civil society actors 
and groups. The picture that emerges from our analysis by necessity 
plays out unevenly across the nation [45]. To analytically integrate the 
‘big picture’ of the new coal geography in its entirety, with the ‘smaller 
picture’ of its manifestation in, and impact on, particular localities and 
environments in Goa state, we apply a multi-level perspective. This al-
lows us to outline national energy development while providing deeper 
insights into one specific local context. This is particularly relevant in 
India’s federally organised governance system wherein the state 
4 Since our analysis focuses on the spatial and political-economic aspects, we 
prefer the use of coal geography to Lahiri-Dutt’s coal world.  
5 We here outline only the main characteristics of the old geography for 
comparative purposes (see [28] for further details). 
6 Such processes are well known in the global and Indian land-grabbing 
literature where so-called vacant lands have been identified for new in-
vestments [41–43].  
7 Available environmental approval documents show that many coastal 
power projects propose to use a mix of domestic and imported coal in spite of 
their different chemical compositions. 
P. Oskarsson et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Energy Research & Social Science 73 (2021) 101903
4
governments exercise authority over several domains that impact 
directly on energy transitions, including land governance. 
We use the Goa case study as an ‘exploratory’ rather than a typical 
case [46] to analyse emerging sub-national rearrangements of existing 
and new energy infrastructures that enable the new coal geography to 
materialise. By moving the analysis to a lower level, we draw attention 
to (1) the extensive and oftentimes environmentally destructive trans-
formations in infrastructure, land use and biophysical environments that 
occur as particular regions are integrated into India’s new coal geog-
raphy; and (2) the uneven and regionally varied nature of the national 
geography. In using Goa as our case study, we acknowledge that it is not 
a representative case – indeed, it is India’s smallest state, and one of its 
wealthiest. At the same time, the integration of Goa into the new coal 
geography, as it currently unfolds, is characterised by two transitions 
that render Goa useful as an exploratory case: the transition of the region 
from marginal to central in the coal trade as existing iron ore export 
infrastructure was repurposed for coal imports; and the slow but steady 
transition in coal imports from coking to thermal coal. 
For the big picture, we combine publicly available government 
documents and news reports with satellite images. We analyse the 
thermal power projects that were approved up to 18 November 2019 in 
all the coastal districts of India, according to information available on 
the website of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. 
We found 84 cases in total that we classified as coastal, and we examined 
their environmental clearance approvals along with other administra-
tive documents to identify their stages of operation (under construction, 
delayed, operating or cancelled), the composition and percentage of coal 
in supplies (domestic/imported) and the project promoters (private/ 
public). We also used the largest inventory of global environmental 
justice movements, the Atlas of Environmental Justice (www.ejatlas. 
org) [99], in combination with local news reports to analyse active 
protests against these coastal power plants. 
To examine actual implementation on the ground and create the map 
in Fig. 1 below, we visually inspected satellite images. This does not 
require advanced GIS analysis. As Oskarsson, Lahiri-Dutt and 
Wennström ([34]: 9) point out, ‘anyone with an internet connection can 
browse Google Earth images to see the “black holes” at the heart of In-
dia’s energy security’ since mining, transport and electricity-generation 
activities based on coal colour the infrastructure and its immediate 
surroundings pitch black. Unfortunately, a lack of data prevents us from 
fully untangling the international coal supply network to see the ‘global 
picture’ that feeds into India’s new coal geography. We know, however, 
that supplies come from Indian-owned mines in, for example, Australia, 
Indonesia and Mozambique [47,48], while other supplies are purchased 
on the global market from independent producers, or even occasionally 
on the domestic market if coal is available at a lower rate. 
Our analysis of the Goa case is based on a combination of qualitative 
field research in the ethnographic tradition, coupled with a desk study of 
relevant documents. The second author has worked on environmental 
challenges in Goa over several years, while the fourth author conducted 
month-long fieldwork in 2017 focusing explicitly on coal protests. The 
fourth author conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with social and 
environmental activists, journalists, fishing communities and concerned 
citizens affected by coal projects. The fourth author also observed 
community meetings that passed resolutions against coal. We have also 
analysed key policy documents pertaining to coal-related infrastructure 
projects in Goa, and have closely monitored the news coverage of coal- 
related developments in the state over the past four years. We have also 
analysed reports and other public statements produced by civil society 
and activist groups. 
4. The emergence of India’s new coal geography 
The preconditions for India’s new coal geography lie in the liberal-
isation of the economy from the 1980s onward, which slowly opened the 
coal energy sector to private sector actors [28]. An early key reform in 
the sector happened in the year 2000, when the private sector was 
allowed to mine coal for its own industrial production purposes in, for 
example, cement and steel-making units. And since 2018 the entire 
sector has been opened up for private companies, including interna-
tional ones [49]. Other significant policy reforms that have paved the 
way for the new coal geography include the possibility of importing the 
coal and power generation technologies required to expand energy 
production. In combination, these reforms and rearrangements repre-
sent dramatic change for an industry long stuck in old ways of producing 
energy [28,31]. 
As shown above, it was in response to an intensifying energy crisis 
that extensive policy experimentation in the domain of energy began 
around 1995. This process would unfold over several decades and 
involved frequent adjustments between various branches of the GoI, led 
by its Ministry of Power. The focus was initially on domestic coal-based 
power expansion (as well as hydro), but widened over the years to 
include private sector thermal power from 2006 [39,40]. Key to the 
development of India’s new coal geography was the Ultra Mega Power 
Production (UMPP) policy, introduced in 2005, to support large power 
plants of at least 4000 MW using high efficiency Super Critical Tech-
nology. By establishing a set of very large power plants, the GoI hoped to 
generate a further 100,000 MW by the year 2012. Nine projects were 
originally proposed, with four located next to coal mines and five in 
coastal locations. One key reason for selecting coastal locations – other 
than the use of imported coal – was the possibility of using seawater for 
cooling, thus solving the problem of scarcity of freshwater that 
hampered plants on the fringes of Indian cities [50]. 
While most coal projects proposed since the early 2000s were based 
on the use of domestic coal, UMPP projects encouraged the use of im-
ported coal of a higher quality than what is available in India, particu-
larly in terms of sulphur content [51,52]. Over the years, more proposals 
were made. Fifteen received approval, with approximately half of these 
intending to use imported coal [50]. However, to date only two UMPPs 
have become operational: the coastal Mundra power plant in Gujarat 
and the Sasan power plant next to a coal mine in the central Indian state 
Madhya Pradesh [52]. Reasons for the failure of UMPP projects to start 
operations are similar to those that have affected other large power 
plants across the country: public protests over land acquisition, delayed 
or denied environmental approvals and a lack of affordable coal supplies 
[51]. In spite of its limited appeal, the UMPP policy did manage to open 
up a new approach to producing power in coastal locations, something 
that had not been attempted before. One key Ministry of Coal planning 
document noted already in the early years of coastal power de-
velopments that ‘importing power grade coal for consumption in power 
plants at certain coastal locations … is considered necessary for 
enhancing fuel diversification and energy security ([53]: 4)’. 
While overcoming the energy crisis has been a top, long-term na-
tional goal, significant resistance to foreign energy dependency remains 
within key government ministries. The import of oil and natural gas 
weighs heavily on India’s balance of trade, and branches of the GoI have 
therefore not looked favourably at adding coal to the list of imported 
fuels. Successive high-level ministers have continued to reiterate their 
intention to end all import of coal, and recently the Minister of Coal 
stated that all coal imports would end in the fiscal year 2023–2024 [54]. 
Yet in spite of such statements, the amount of imported coal continues to 
rise. This is in no small part due to other branches of the GoI offering 
support for coal imports, including reduced taxes.8 But exactly where all 
this coal is used is unclear as data remains incomplete. The Central 
8 While analysing why different Indian ministries entertain widely different 
attitudes towards coal is beyond the scope of this article, we note that such 
‘internal contradictions within the state’, to use Poulantzas’ [55] wording, are 
not uncommon in India. See Sampat [56] for a comparable and highly illus-
trative example of such internal contradictions in the domain of land use and 
governance. 
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Electricity Authority [57] of the Ministry of Power states that for the 
fiscal year 2018–2019, 61 million of a total of 150 million tons of im-
ported coal was used in power production. Of this, 40 million tons was 
used for coastal coal producers designed to use imported coal, while a 
further 21 million tons was imported for power plants intended to use 
domestic coal. The imported coal in the latter category is termed 
‘blended coal’ and is used to augment uncertain and more polluting 
supplies from domestic sources.9 All in all, many coastal as well as 
interior power plants continue to struggle with the quantity, quality and 
price of coal. 
In GoI environmental approval documents, thermal power-plant 
proponents are typically only required to broadly indicate the source 
of the coal they plan to use, even though the composition of the coal has 
a direct bearing on pollution-control measures as well as financial 
viability. For example, the approval for Adani Power Ltd.’s Mundra 
thermal power plant merely states that international coal will be used 
[59]. At times requirements are included to specify the country of origin, 
such as Indonesian coal for the Ennore Creek thermal power plant [60]. 
Coastal power plants may also indicate a range from 100 percent im-
ported coal to as little as 30 percent. Adding to the regulatory uncer-
tainty is the flexibility that producers have to use more domestic coal 
when this becomes available, as the GoI has allowed already operating 
power plants to shift part of the coal to lower cost Indian coal [57]. 
Available statistics indicate, however, that the opposite also occurs as 
power plants designed to run on domestic coal use imported coal [57]. 
Given this flexibility to switch between sources of supply, we may expect 
further coal supply changes as operators align with domestic and in-
ternational coal market fluctuations, changing regulatory norms and the 
overall trajectory of the Indian power sector. 
Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of thermal power coal and 
has been the main source for India’s coastal power plants. One source 
places the country’s share at 61 percent in 2018 [61]. Domestic and 
international coal market purchases make up the remainder of imported 
coal to India, although details about the quantities and qualities remain 
scarce. Direct ownership of coal assets abroad by Indian firms include 
Indonesian mines, where Tata Power has been the co-owner of the PT 
Kaltim Prima Coal mine since 2007 [48], while GMR has been a co- 
owner of PT Golden Energy Mines since 2011 [62]. A number of In-
dian companies have attempted to establish Australian coal mines. The 
largest and most controversial among these is the Adani Group’s pro-
posed Carmichael mine and GVK’s Alpha Project [63,64]. The cost of 
transporting coal is always a major concern for low-cost operations like 
those in India [65], but transportation costs become even more impor-
tant for imported coal since transport across oceans is often two to three 
times as high as the cost of transporting domestic coal. Data from the 
Indian Ports Association [66] show that 58 million tons of coal was 
handled across public sector ports during the six months from April to 
November 2019. However, these statistics do not disaggregate handling, 
and some of the coal that is moved along the Indian coastline is domestic 
coal. The Adani Group, which owns a number of thermal power plants, 
also handles about a third of all Indian coal imports via its ports [9]. The 
company operates five ports around India with the flexibility to switch 
to domestic coal if this becomes preferable to international coal. In a 
newspaper interview, one Adani executive stated: ‘[…] that’s the 
advantage we have. Having ports on both sides of the peninsula, you can 
catch coal for instance at Dhamra and ship it to Goa, Vizag [Visakha-
patnam], Mundhra or Dahej’ [67]. The power plants of India’s new coal 
geography will depend on shipments of coal for decades to come, and an 
operator such as the Adani Group is well positioned to ensure a flexible 
supply of it via its ports, from a variety of international and domestic 
sources. Flexibility in coal supply and port infrastructure are, in this 
manner, two additional key enablers of the new coal geography. 
Fig. 1. Coastal power plants and coal ports.  
9 Among the 54 public and private thermal power plants listed in 2020 as 
using blended coal, many are located far from the coast in northern states like 
Punjab or Chandigarh [58]. These power plants have, in many cases, been 
forced to import low ash coal to comply with air quality regulations. 
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GoI data shows that 77 coastal power plants with widely variable 
power-generation sizes were approved from 2005 to 2014, mainly by 
private sector proponents, but also by public sector ones. The projects 
were environmentally approved, which means that specific sites had 
been identified and that detailed Environmental Impact Assessment 
reports had been finalised and extensively vetted in both public hearings 
and by environmental experts [68]. In contrast, after 2014 only seven 
projects have been approved, possibly because imported coal has 
become more expensive. Had all 84 environmentally approved coastal 
power plants been operational, they would have added significantly to 
India’s current 281 operational thermal power plants [69]. However, as 
of early 2020, ‘only’ 27 of these 84 power plants (with an installed ca-
pacity of 36,600 MW) are operational while a further three are under 
construction. This indicates the difficult and contested path from formal 
approval to actual operations (see Table 1). In addition, the operational 
power plants often have less installed capacity than in the approval 
document, but the range is very wide, from a mere 60 MW to 4620 MW. 
Some of the new energy producers are among India’s largest business 
groups, including Adani, Reliance and Tata. The Adani Group has, in 
addition to building ports, been active in thermal power by building its 
own coastal power plants and buying already existing ones [70]. At the 
same time, the company has invested in a new power plant away from 
the coast, running on domestic coal [71]. Other power producers include 
companies with generic names like Coastal Energen Pvt Ltd and Thermal 
Powertech Ltd.10 Little is known about these companies and their 
operational and financial strengths. Data also shows five public sector 
power plants using imported coal, though only as a supplement to the 
main supply of domestic coal. 
As seen in Fig. 1 below, we find thermal power clusters across a few 
states: in Gujarat (seven power plants), Andhra Pradesh (six) and Tamil 
Nadu (seven). These are industrialised or higher income states and have 
higher energy demand. Within the states with coastal power, most of the 
power plants form coal clusters in the immediate vicinity of a coal port. 
A few larger companies have also been able to build dedicated ports to 
import coal to meet their own needs. Moving the coal a short distance 
overland from ports to power plants appears the preferred choice for 
operators, rather than locating the power plant on cheaper land further 
away from the port. But the picture is somewhat muddled as we also 
witness the opposite phenomenon where power plants that are located 
in or close to the main coal mining regions import coal, while power 
plants located further away from Indian coalfields still use domestic 
coal. The possibility to secure domestic coal supply contracts in many 
cases appears to trump the logistical considerations of coal transport. 
In sum, India’s new coal geography consists of coastal power plants 
spread across the country and driven by many different investors, from 
well-known Indian business groups to state power producers and rela-
tively unknown private entities. The fact that these plants have great 
operational flexibility indicates the considerable political support they 
enjoy: where public authorities could have strictly enforced approval 
conditions pertaining to plant size, fuel use or environmental 
regulations, they have, in practice, preferred that power plants are 
established and become and remain operational.11 It is, however, also 
apparent that many power producers persistently struggle to operate 
profitably with widespread low plant load factors, frequent attempts to 
renegotiate power purchasing rates and attempts to secure lower cost 
coal supplies (see e.g. [61,72,73]). While we thus note that overall the 
private sector appears to be preferred, when establishing new port and 
power plant infrastructure, the new coal geography, along with India’s 
wider coal sector, struggles in actual operations, characterised by dra-
matic declines in private shareholder value and recurring government 
bailouts of public power plants [33,72]. 
While this section has mapped and analysed the big picture of India’s 
new coal geography, we now turn to the analysis of how this geography 
is established in specific sub-national locations. 
5. Goa: Reassembling infrastructure for India’s new coal 
geography 
Although Goa is now emerging as a new coal hub, it was iron ore 
mining that had long played an important role in the state’s economy, 
and much of the state’s infrastructure was configured to cater to mining. 
Mines in their own right claim much land, but the mining infrastructure 
additionally incorporated road transport networks [76] and riverine 
spaces, since much of the ore was transported by barge from the mining 
areas to the Mormugao port for export. The public sector Mormugao 
Port Trust (MPT), which operates the port, derived most of its revenue 
from iron ore exports. If capital is indeed value in motion, as Marx would 
argue [77], the mining ban that was imposed in Goa in 2012 severely 
undermined the ability of Goa’s mining infrastructure to serve the needs 
of capital. When mining activities stopped, the associated infrastructure 
no longer underpinned the movement of raw materials, goods and ser-
vices, and thus no longer played a role in the generation of capitalist 
value. Mining sites turned unproductive, barges and trucks sat idle, 
roads and rivers saw less traffic and activities and revenue for MPT fell 
dramatically. The ban on mining was thus a central component in a 
conjuncture in which multiple factors coalesced to create enabling 
conditions for the emergence of a new coal geography: the loss of jobs 
and income caused by the collapse of mining; a dormant infrastructure; a 
revenue crisis at MPT; a new national Indian government with grand 
visions for new infrastructure projects; and private industrial actors 
requiring coal. From this conjuncture emerged attempts to rework the 
state’s existing infrastructure to a new coal geography. 
At Mormugao port, central actors (both public and private) moved 
relatively quickly to reposition it as a multi-commodity port with an 
important coal component. In 2015, the port had two dedicated coal 
terminals, both run by private operators: one by a subsidiary of the 
private sector group Jindal South West (JSW), JSW Port Ltd.; the other 
by the private sector conglomerate Adani Group’s Adani Mormugao Port 
Terminal Private Ltd. While coal had started arriving in minor quantities 
already in the 1990s [78], total coal imports stood at only 2.7 million 
tons in 2001. In 2011–2012, this amount had risen to nearly 7 million 
tons and in 2015–2016 to nearly 12 million tons per year – an increase of 
more than 70 percent in four years. In contrast to the new national coal 
geography, for which thermal coal is crucial, coking coal still dominates 
at Mormugao port. Coking coal comprised 82 percent of total coal im-
ports in 2011–2012 and 67 percent in 2015–2016. But a transition is 
Table 1 
Coastal thermal power plants in India.  
Total proposed 84 
Cancelled or delayed 54 
Operating 27 
Under construction 3 
Source: [69] and own analysis. 
10 M/S. Coastal Energen Pvt Ltd. runs a 1050 MW power plant in Thoothukudi 
District, Tamil Nadu, M/S. Thermal Powertech Corporation India Limited has a 
1980 MW unit in Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh. M/S. Ind-Barath Power 
(Madras) Ltd. operates a 660 MW power plant in Thoothukudi District, Tamil 
Nadu. M/S. Torrent Energy Ltd operates a 950 MW unit in Bharuch District in 
Gujarat. 
11 Since economic liberalisation, the structural power of Indian business in 
general has expanded dramatically, if unevenly [74]; but beyond such general 
assertions, little is known about how energy investors connect to policy makers, 
the strategies they deploy, etc. Gautam Adani, the chairman of the Adani 
Group, India’s largest private coal mining company, largest coal port operator 
and largest coal importer, is known to have been close to Prime Minister Modi 
for many years, and allegations of crony capitalism (also in the coal sector) are 
often raised [75]. But details remain scarce. 
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clearly under way as the growth of thermal coal imports has outpaced 
coking coal during this period: thermal coal imports more than tripled 
while coking coal imports grew by 37 percent. 
The integration of Goa into India’s new coal geography aligns with 
the big national infrastructure programs of the GoI, namely Bharatmala 
and Sagarmala. The former is a road and highways project, while the 
latter seeks to ‘unlock’ the potential of India’s waterways and coastline 
to promote ‘port-led prosperity’. Under Sagarmala, a new master plan 
for Mormugao port was finalised in 2016 in which coal imports played a 
key role. To turn the port into a coal hub, the plan envisioned several 
new infrastructure projects at the port. One was the capacity expansion 
of the existing coal berths run by private actors to double imports [79]. 
The second was the expansion of the approach channel to enable much 
larger vessels carrying more cargo to dock. The third was the develop-
ment of three additional berths to be used for coal import by Vedanta 
Limited, one of the largest extractive industry companies in the world 
[80]. The ambitious master plan operates with an ‘optimistic scenario’ 
in which up to 50 million tons of coal would arrive per year by 2035. To 
reach this target the master plan identifies 17 coal-backed power plants 
and more than 20 steel plants ‘in the pipeline in the hinterland’ ([81]: 
291) as potential clients and envisions a much greater role for imported 
thermal coal in the future. 
The coal geography that MPT’s ‘hub’ connects to is truly global. As 
described by The Indian Express [82], a coal shipment for a steel factory 
in Karnataka began its journey in South Africa’s Richards Bay – one of 
the largest coal export facilities in the world – where it was loaded onto a 
vessel sailing under a Bahamas flag, by the Singapore based importer 
Adani Global Private. After it arrived in Goás Mormugao port, it was 
transported by road to its final destination in Koppal, Karnataka state. 
Currently, the destination for most of the imported coal is the expand-
ing, coking coal dependent steel factories in Karnataka, across the state 
border [79]. The Karnataka steel industry includes key actors at the MPT 
such as JSW Steel, another subsidiary of JSW. Its Bellary unit is the 
largest steel plant in the region, requiring more than 15 million tons of 
coking coal per year [78]. While this demand is largely met by ports 
located on India’s East coast, JSW’s terminal at MPT supplies one third 
of the coking coal [78,79]. The closer proximity to Mormugao port cuts 
down costs for JSW and is the main driver of the company’s desire to 
expand its import via Goa. The Adani Group, another key actor involved 
in the reconfiguration of Mormugao port, mainly imports coal for its 
clients in the steel industry in Karnataka. But Adani is also India’s largest 
private thermal power producer with an installed capacity of 12,450 
MW, most of which is coal based. This includes a 1200 MW capacity 
thermal power plant in Udupi, in coastal Karnataka, which uses 100 
percent imported coal as fuel and is proposed for a significant expansion 
to 2800 MW. 
While the first part of Goa’s infrastructural rearrangement thus 
centred on the expansion of an existing public port to enable private 
operators to import more coal, the second part centred on enabling the 
movement of imported coal from Mormugao port to destinations in 
Karnataka state. This involved widening and/or linking existing roads, 
doubling existing railway capacity and setting up power transmission 
lines to provide power generated outside the state to flow into Goa. 
Existing road, rail and riverine infrastructure is thus being reassembled 
to suit the needs of coal, with new infrastructure being added as well. 
These ambitious plans for a new road-river-rail corridor between Goa 
and Karnataka all entailed construction in the ecologically sensitive 
Western Ghats mountain range, one of the world’s ‘hottest biodiversity 
hotspots’ and home to two wildlife sanctuaries. In addition to widening 
existing roads to enable more trucks to pass, an entirely new highway on 
viaducts running through pristine parts of one wildlife sanctuary is 
planned [78,80]. The new power transmissions lines similarly run 
through the wildlife sanctuary for several kilometres, while the laying of 
a second railway track through the Western Ghats takes place on the 
steepest gradient anywhere on the Indian Railway System [83]. Ac-
cording to official figures, more than 34,000 tonnes of coal is 
transported by this rail route every day, most of it by JSW [84,85]. 
Existing riverine infrastructure is also being integrated into the new coal 
geography. Six rivers have been nationalised under the National Wa-
terways Act, 2016, in order to facilitate their rapid ‘development’ with, 
among other things, new jetties [86] that are ostensibly designed to 
stagger coal silos from MPT towards the east [82]. In combination, the 
road and rail projects will mean that 80,000 trees need to be cut and 
more than 200 ha of protected and reserve forests in the Western Ghats 
diverted [83]. The integration of Goa into the new coal geography will in 
these ways affect a large number of Goan villages [87,88]. 
Many of these deeply interrelated coal projects only make economic 
and infrastructural sense when seen as a singular intervention. Offi-
cially, they have, however, been split into small, isolated projects. This 
obscures the bigger infrastructural transformation underfoot, artificially 
minimises the ‘official’ environmental impact of the new coal geography 
and makes it difficult for those affected by localised coal-related de-
velopments to organise politically across sites and scales (for similar 
experiences see [34,89]). Yet from an environmental justice perspective, 
the negative impacts have been evident in Goa, and resistance has been 
considerable. Goan activists and civil society groups have documented 
how repeated violations of coal handling at Mormugao port, for example 
uncovered coal storage areas, causing coal dust to travel for miles [90], 
‘blackening lungs, pushing up incidents of respiratory disorder … 
threatening fragile forests, paddy fields, countless streams and rivers’ 
[84]. Cases of bronchitis, sinusitis and pulmonary disorders have 
reportedly increased manifold, and the layers of coal dust that settle on 
fields and plants may damage photosynthesis, affecting crop yields and 
biodiversity [82]. Inadequately covered rail wagons spill coal along 
their journey through the state and release fugitive dust emissions [90]. 
The increased movement of trains and trucks with heavy loads also 
threaten old heritage buildings [84], and the channel dredging and ca-
pacity expansion at MPT coupled with riverine coal transport threaten to 
destroy the livelihoods of local fishing communities [80]. Coal has also 
been documented washing up on beaches, both in large chunks and as 
fine dust. 
The vibrancy of Goan civil society [91] has ensured considerable 
popular opposition to the integration of Goa into India’s new coal ge-
ography. Close to one third of Goa’s villages have passed resolutions 
opposing the movement of coal through their areas [83], and different 
social movements have organised to stop coal-related infrastructural 
developments. This includes the Old Cross Fishing Canoe Owners Co-op 
Society, which is connected to the National Fishworkers Forum, as well 
as Goa Against Coal and Our River, Our Rights. The environmental ap-
peals court – the National Green Tribunal – has been petitioned and 
cases have been filed in state-level courts; and the popular protests 
against coal led to the mandatory public hearing on environmental 
impacts for the Mormugao port expansion and road construction being 
extended to a full eight days, making it probably the longest ever public 
hearing in India. And, in the summer of 2020, protests against laying 
double tracks for railway transportation of coal erupted in many vil-
lages. Various state institutions have also interfered in the process. The 
Goa State Pollution Control Board has ordered reduced coal handling at 
Mormugao port, or has temporarily withdrawn its consent to operate, 
following breaches in pollution levels or excess coal handling. The Goa 
Coastal Zone Management Authority has expressed concerns about the 
consequences of dredging the approach channel to the port; and the 
High Court has admitted Public Interest Litigation against coal, even if it 
has refused interim stays on coal handling [92]. The integration of Goa 
into India’s new coal geography has thus been highly controversial and 
the negative environmental and social consequences evident. But the 
import and transport of coal continues with strong political support. 
The emergence of Goa as a coal hub within India’s new coal geog-
raphy is illustrative of the uneven and varied manifestation of this ge-
ography and of the ways in which it appropriates, reassembles and adds 
to existing infrastructure to suit the needs of imported coal, often with 
environmentally destructive effects. For instance, rather than using a 
P. Oskarsson et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Energy Research & Social Science 73 (2021) 101903
8
newly established port on ‘easy to acquire’ coastal lands, existing public 
sector ports were used in Goa. Both in Goa and in several other states, 
private companies operating within public sector ports are in fact the 
key movers of coal. In this regard, Mormugao port resembles Visakha-
patnam port in Andhra Pradesh, Chennai port in Tamil Nadu and New 
Mangalore port in Karnataka, where official ownership is with the public 
sector, but where privately operated ‘berths’ within these ports do the 
actual heavy lifting. The infrastructure put in place by the national In-
dian government over many decades is thus put to use in the new coal 
geography by private sector investors who are able to swiftly adjust to 
new opportunities for importing coal or for moving domestic coal from 
one coast to the other. While the overall extent of this form of ‘hidden 
privatisation’ – where formal ownership remains public while opera-
tions are carried out by private companies – is not known, it is striking 
that parts of India’s old coal geography have similarly been stealthily 
privatised, with many of Coal India’s officially public sector mines in 
central India now outsourced to private operators [30]. 
Our Goa case is also illustrative of some of the contingencies and 
conjunctural specificities (e.g. the collapse of mining and the revenue 
crisis of MPT) that enable and shape the uneven integration of a region 
into India’s new coal geography. In this sense, more regionally focused 
empirical research is needed to understand the specificities for other 
regions and states. Unlike, for example, Goa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu, the state of Gujarat follows a very different pattern insofar as its 
coastal coal infrastructure does not consist of a focused geographical 
agglomeration next to a major port. Instead, many power plants in 
Gujarat simply have their own ports. In contrast, although Goa has a 
major public port by national standards, its State Electricity Department 
does not have its own power generating facilities, but depends entirely 
on allocations made by the central government, with roughly 80 percent 
of the contribution coming from coal-based power plants outside the 
state. Specific state-level political economies are thus important in 
shaping how a region is integrated into (or is left out of) the national coal 
geography. 
Lastly, the Goa case has illustrated the considerable political support 
for India’s new coal geography. The arrival of coal in Goa has been very 
unpopular among a broad section of citizens, and opposition has been 
significant. Goa arguably has India’s most vibrant, most active and most 
resourceful civil society. Class and rural-urban differences are less pro-
nounced in Goa than elsewhere in India, and there is a long history of 
social movements from below centred on the preservation of land, for-
ests and livelihoods, all of which continue to inspire environmental 
activism in the present [91]. Yet, while the anti-coal campaigns in Goa 
might have succeeded in slowing down the transitions underfoot, they 
have not been able to stop coal in its tracks.12 This does not bode well for 
other states where the political support for coastal coal is equally robust, 
but civil society is weaker. 
As we argued earlier, Goa may not be a ‘typical’ case of how sub- 
national regions are integrated into India’s new coal geography. While 
further research may indicate differently, there may in fact not be a 
typical sub-national case. Other states with significant coastal power – 
primarily Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu – all present 
different combinations of features that have enabled the new coal ge-
ography. In contrast, states with coastal locations and industrialised 
economies like Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal, which could 
have been integrated into the new coal geography, have not extensively 
supported coastal coal power plants. Untangling the drivers of the un-
even manifestation of India’s new coal geography is thus a complicated 
affair that requires in-depth studies at the intermediate and local levels. 
6. Conclusion: A new Indian coal geography reinforces fossil 
fuel dependence 
The development of a hitherto unmapped new Indian coal geogra-
phy, located along the Indian coastline, dependent on imported coal and 
reliant primarily on the private sector, presents the emergence of a new 
resource landscape. This new energyscape is disconnected from the ‘old’ 
coal geography that was centred on extraction in the coal-bearing cen-
tral-eastern heartlands, heavy duty railway transport and power pro-
duction on the peri-urban fringes of mega cities. India’s new coal 
geography reinforces fossil fuel dependence, and, as such, represents a 
transition to additional coal-based energy in spite of the rise of lower 
cost renewable energy solutions. 
While the prolonged Indian energy crisis from the 1990s onward 
paved the way for the establishment of the new coal geography, there 
was no clearly articulated government master plan driving its emer-
gence and no coherent centralised policy approach that made it happen. 
What we have seen is, rather, a prolonged period of gradual and 
distributed experimentation and flexible adjustment by private and 
public sector companies, but also across national and state governments, 
at a conjuncture of energy crisis that created enabling conditions for the 
emergence of a new coal geography operating alongside the old one. The 
new coal geography is thus not simply the outcome of unleashed market 
forces as much as private sector investors who were taking the lead: 
private coal depended on state divestment and reduced government 
control over energy and coal, but it also crucially piggybacked on India’s 
political and bureaucratic structures for support, clearances and per-
mits. Indeed, existing public infrastructure and extensive government 
support were (and continue to be) essential for making the new coal 
geography financially, politically and logistically possible. India’s new 
coal geography, thus, relies on deregulation, even as it looks for support 
from the same political and bureaucratic structures during initial 
establishment and continued coal operations. The private sector in-
vestors of the new coal geography, in this manner and in the words of 
Bear ([95]: 19), sought to ‘accumulate capital and power from the long- 
term history of colonial public works and their reconstitution in the 
present’. 
While coal, thus, continues to be India’s favourite fuel for electrical 
energy, the reasons for this are not simply straight-forward path- 
dependence. The flexible and responsive public–private collaboration in 
the domain of coal energy that we have analysed in this article has 
managed to put in place coal transport and thermal power generation 
capacity (via old and new coal geographies) on such a scale that it has 
largely succeeded in overcoming India’s persistent electrical energy 
supply crisis.13 Coal energy, thus, continues to enjoy policy support, in 
spite of occasional statements to the contrary [96]. And very large public 
investments have already been sunk into the material and infrastructural 
systems that sustain the new coal geography, suggesting that it will not 
be easily abandoned.14 At the same time, it is very clear that a large part 
of India’s thermal power sector is far from profitable. Operations are 
characterised by low plant-load factors, renegotiated price-purchasing 
agreements, changes to lower cost coal supplies, reduced 
12 This ability to ignore or fend off anti-coal protests in Goa is derived from the 
intimate nature of its dominant state-business alliance wherein the distinction 
between political and economic elites is blurred. Many political and bureau-
cratic careers in Goa are built on successful business ventures – in the real estate 
sector or in more or less direct involvement in the mining industry. It is well 
documented that some of Goa’s most important political families function as 
focal points for large networks that span across the government, the bureau-
cracy and industry, whose shared interests they both articulate and respond to 
[93,94]. 
13 Other persistent problems such as the equitable distribution of electricity to 
all citizens, including the poorest, and the inability to deal with the negative 
environmental and social consequences of energy production remain largely 
unaddressed at a national level [21,22].  
14 Further research would do well to connect India’s new coal geography to its 
various international supply chains to understand rearrangements in coal- 
producing territories around the world and the political economy of coal trade. 
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environmental control and hollowed out shareholder prices on the stock 
market. The state-business collaboration that is able to build and operate 
coastal coal energy infrastructure is, in these respects, a highly uneven 
one without clear winners. And yet the infrastructure continues to find 
enough support to remain operational while coal imports rise steadily.15 
And as we move to the state-level, we are able to note how, in 
addition to the prolonged work of experimentation and adjustment be-
tween many actors, the consolidation of coal also depended on consid-
erable on-the-ground work to retrofit existing, and adding new, 
infrastructure. In other words, even as India continues to rely on coal, 
which is the most conventional form of energy known in the country, it 
has taken an enormous amount of effort to establish the new coal ge-
ography. These efforts include large monetary investments by private- 
and public-sector actors in infrastructure capable of handling millions of 
tons of coal and generating vast amounts of thermal power. But they also 
include the proactive support of political and bureaucratic structures 
across consecutive national governments and the different sub-national 
legislative bodies which are part of India’s system of federal governance. 
In our Goa case study, support from public authorities was apparent, 
with a few notable exceptions, as various civil society groups and actors 
objected to aspects of the new coal operations from the expansion of port 
facilities, to storage and transport solutions. With the spectre of energy 
crisis still in recent memory, it appears that Indian policy makers prefer 
to continue supporting the new coal geography, even when renewable 
energy is available at a lower cost. 
At a moment in history when climate change is evident and India’s 
domestic renewable energy sector is fast expanding, the well-entrenched 
and expanding infrastructure and policy support, which underpins the 
new coal geography – and hence coal energy in India more generally – 
raises particularly complicated and uncomfortable questions about the 
country’s possibilities to transition to low carbon energy in the future: Is 
India’s new coal geography sufficiently robust to fend off the twin 
challenges of climate change and cheap renewables in the short to me-
dium term? Based on the analysis in this article, the answer would seem 
to be a tentative yes. In relation to the increasing use of imported coal, it 
is noteworthy that India’s first domestic commercial coal mine auction 
took place on 18 June 2020 under the slogan Unleashing Coal. With this 
auction, the government aimed to attract new private investors to 41 
domestic coal mines – many of them in biodiversity rich forest areas – 
and make the country self-reliant in coal [97]. Tellingly, the prime 
minister had spoken of turning coal to diamonds through the auction 
process [98]. Rather than a transition away from coal, the main energy- 
policy question in India today, thus, concerns the relative share of do-
mestic to imported coal within the dominant coal-based energyscape. 
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